The distinction between a choice in which the consequences fall on one's own shoulders and a choice in which the consequences fall on the shoulders of others is a meaningless distinction in the context of Sartre's thought. In deciding to do anything at all, one is in effect legislating for all of humanity. Ethical judgment and responsibility, then, is always implicitly both self and other-directed. Sartre says:
When a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind—in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility.
Note the absence of consequentialist or deontological thinking in this formulation. There are no a priori rules nor any means of weighing relative moral costs and/or benefits either to the self or to others. The aim is consciously to carry this burden and to know that consciousness of being is thus emburdened, as it were, and is the only freedom. The impossibility of escape to which Sartre refers is the impossibility of an escape from responsibility for "the whole of mankind," not for oneself understood in contradistinction to another.
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